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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 Defendant appeals from a conviction for burglary, a second degree 
felony.  This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West Supp. 2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  Did the trial court properly deny Defendant’s directed verdict 
motion, where the evidence showed that Defendant unlawfully entered the 
home of his deceased lover through a window when no one was home, exited 
five minutes later, and then fled?  
 Standard of Review. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a directed 
verdict motion, this Court’s standard of review is “highly deferential.” State 
v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶30, 326 P.3d 645. This Court “will uphold the trial 
-2- 
court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be 
reasonably drawn from it,” the Court concludes “that some evidence exists 
from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, 84 
P.3d 1183. 
 2.  Did the trial court properly admit a witness’s prior inconsistent 
statement to impeach the witness, where the statement was not admitted for 
the truth of the matter asserted and was not used as evidence of Defendant’s 
intent?   
 Standard of Review.  This Court reviews “a trial court’s evidentiary 
rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Isaacson, 2017 UT App 1, ¶9, 391 
P.3d 364. 
 3.  Was the trial court required to give sua sponte, or was defense 
counsel constitutionally compelled to seek, an instruction defining “intent” 
for the “intent to commit … theft” element of burglary, where its meaning is 
evident from its plain language?1 
 Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine precludes plain error 
review of the trial court’s alleged error. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 
                                              
1 This Point responds to Points III and IV in Defendant’s brief. 
-3- 
¶9, 86 P.3d 742. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised 
for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review, and this 
court must decide whether the defendant was deprived of effective assistance 
as a matter of law.” State v. Allgood, 2017 UT App 92, ¶18, ___ P.3d ___ 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 4. Has Defendant shown cumulative error, where he has not shown 
error, let alone any prejudice therefrom?2 
 Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A:  
  U.S. Const. amend. VI; 
  Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West Supp. 2014) (burglary); 
  Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (West Supp. 2012) (criminal trespass). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
 Defendant and April Taylor were lovers when April unexpectedly 
died. R612. April was married at the time, but her husband, Zakary, did not 
find out about the affair until a few days before April’s death. R436-38. 
                                              
2 This Point responds to Point V in Defendant’s brief. 
-4- 
Defendant and April had spent time at April and Zakary’s home during their 
affair. R431,612. Defendant took April’s death “really rough.” R613.  
 April was Celeste Atkinson’s best friend. R424. Celeste knew about 
April’s affair with Defendant, and April had shown her photos of Defendant. 
R407,415,425. Celeste had also met Defendant once at April’s home when she 
had visited April unexpectedly. R431. Celeste’s husband, Steve, also knew 
about the affair and had seen the same photos. R407,415. 
 Over 100 people attended April’s funeral, including neighbors and 
friends of the couple. R440. Defendant also attended, wearing a “western 
cowboy” hat with feathers on it. R319,363,406-07,427,614. Kristine Starkey, 
who was one of the Taylors’ neighbors, and her daughter Jessica Roberts, 
who knew April and Zakary pretty well, both saw Defendant at the funeral. 
R319,321,360. Neither one of them knew Defendant at the time; but they both 
noticed his hat. R321,363.3 
 It was still daylight when Kristine and Jessica went to Kristine’s home 
after the funeral. R323-24,325,370,406,625. When they arrived, they saw 
Defendant—still wearing his hat—walking down the Taylors’ driveway to 
                                              
3 The funeral included a balloon release in the parking lot afterwards. 
R320-22. For ease of reference, the State refers to the funeral and balloon 
release as simply the funeral.  
-5- 
the back of the Taylors’ house. R324,365-66,387. Kristine and Jessica then 
watched as Defendant carefully removed the screen from a window and 
crawled into the Taylors’ garage. Id. Though they thought Defendant’s 
conduct “weird,” they did not call the police; Kristine figured Zakary had 
asked Defendant to stop at the Taylors’ house to get something, and Jessica 
had just seen Defendant with April’s cousin at the funeral. R326,366-67.  
 Kristine and Jessica went inside Kristine’s house for about five minutes 
and then went back outside. R334,366,377. At that point, they saw Defendant 
crawl back out of the Taylors’ garage window and then carefully replace the 
screen. R327,366. Kristine did not see Defendant carrying anything. R334. 
And when they waved at Defendant, Defendant waved back. R327-28,378.  
 Jessica tried to call a friend of the Taylors, Celeste Atkinson, to see if 
anyone was supposed to be at the Taylor home at the time. R367,370,384. 
Jessica then called the police. R369. As she did, Defendant walked back down 
the Taylors’ driveway and left. R329. Kristine tried to follow Defendant, but 
Defendant had disappeared by the time she reached the end of the driveway. 
R329-30.  
 Just before Defendant left, Celeste and her husband arrived at the 
Taylors’ home.  R369,384. Both of them saw Defendant there. R407,427. 
Celeste called Steve and asked him what Defendant was doing there. R428. 
-6- 
Steve then saw Defendant get into a silver SUV that was waiting just south of 
the Taylors’ home. R409. Steve didn’t think to get the SUV’s license plate 
number. R421.  
 By the time Officer Fielding arrived at the Taylors’ home, several 
people had identified Defendant on Facebook. R379. Officer Fielding then 
looked up Defendant’s name on his computer, got a picture of Defendant’s 
license, and showed the picture to Jessica, who confirmed that he was the 
person who had just left the Taylors’ home. R374,380,383,479. 
 One of the people who had gathered at the Taylors’ home then called 
Defendant and, after Defendant answered, handed the phone to Officer 
Fielding. R380,457,479. Officer Fielding told Defendant that the officer was 
investigating a break-in of the Taylors’ home, that numerous people had 
identified him as the perpetrator, and that the officer wanted Defendant’s 
side of the story. R465. Defendant did not deny breaking into the Taylors’ 
home; rather, after asking how important it was, Defendant said he was busy 
and on his way to Salt Lake City; Defendant then hung up. R466-67. Although 
Officer Fielding later left Defendant a message asking Defendant to call him, 
Defendant never returned Officer Fielding’s phone call. R624.  
 Zakary Taylor had not given Defendant permission to enter the 
Taylors’ home on the day of the funeral. R445-46. After the break-in, Zakary 
-7- 
noticed that golf clubs in his garage had been moved. R451,476. He did not, 
however, notice anything significant missing from his home. R444,453,481. 
 Defendant’s defense. At trial, Defendant claimed that he never went to 
the Taylors’ home on the day of April’s funeral. R615. In support, he 
presented the testimony of several friends who were also at the funeral. 
R499,510,595,602. Those friends testified that they never saw Defendant leave 
the funeral. R502,504,511-12,597. Two of them further testified that after the 
funeral, Defendant hung out with them for the rest of the night. R597,603-04. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 Defendant was charged with one count of burglary, a second degree 
felony. R13-14. Defendant waived his preliminary hearing. R43-45. At trial, 
the jury was also instructed on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. R97.  
 At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for a 
directed verdict on both burglary and criminal trespass, which was denied. 
R489-96. The jury convicted Defendant of burglary. R130. 
 Defendant sought a reduction of his conviction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-402 (West Supp. 2014). R144-47. The court denied the motion, but told 
Defendant the court would consider a reduction upon Defendant’s successful 
completion of probation. R176. The court then sentenced Defendant to a 
-8- 
suspended prison term of one-to-fifteen years, and placed him on three years 
of probation, with sixty days in jail. R185-88. 
 Defendant timely appealed. R193-94. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Point I. Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his 
directed verdict motion. Concerning the burglary charge, Defendant argues 
the evidence was insufficient to establish the “intent to commit … theft” 
element. Concerning the criminal trespass charge, Defendant argues the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that when he entered the Taylors’ 
home, he was “reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear for the 
safety of another.”  
 A trial court may grant a directed verdict “only if, after examining all 
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no 
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party’s 
favor.” Merino v. Albertson’s, Inc., 1999 UT 14, ¶3, 975 P.2d 467 (emphasis 
added). Thus, if “there is any evidence, however slight or circumstantial, 
which tends to show guilt of the crime charged or any of its degrees, it is the 
trial court's duty to submit the case to the jury.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 
¶3384 P.3d 1183 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, a 
-9- 
defendant’s criminal intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof. Thus, it is well 
established that his intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence.  
 Here, the State presented ample evidence supporting Defendant’s 
intent to commit a theft inside Zakary Taylor’s home: Defendant was April 
Taylor’s lover; their relationship was kept secret from April’s husband, 
Zakary, until just before April died; Defendant had spent time at April’s 
house before April’s death; Defendant was “very upset” about April’s death; 
Defendant went to April’s funeral, where he presumably saw Zakary 
occupied; after the funeral, Defendant went to the Taylors’ home, went into 
the back yard, carefully removed a screen from a garage window, and 
crawled into the Taylors’ home through the window; about five minutes 
later, Defendant crawled back out the window and carefully replaced the 
screen; after responding to a neighbor waving at him, Defendant walked 
from the Taylors’ home, quickly got into a waiting silver SUV, and left; when 
Officer Fielding called Defendant a short while later to ask what he was doing 
at the Taylors’ home, Defendant said he was busy and hung up; Defendant 
did not return Officer Fielding’s phone call when the officer later left a 
message asking him to do so; and Defendant did not have permission to enter 
the Taylors’ home on the day of April’s funeral.  
-10- 
 This evidence—especially the brevity of Defendant’s stay in the 
Taylors’ home at a time he could reasonably believe Zakary would not be 
there and Defendant’s unwillingness to talk with Officer Fielding 
afterward—supports a reasonable inference that Defendant unlawfully 
entered the Taylors’ home with the intent to take something from the home. 
This evidence thus constitutes “some evidence … from which a reasonable 
jury could find that the elements” of burglary—particularly Defendant’s 
intent to commit theft—“had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29. 
 Concerning Defendant’s intent for the trespass charge, Defendant 
entered the Taylors’ home without permission when no one was home. 
R324,365-66,387,445-46. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could find, as a 
matter of common experience, that Defendant entered the home recklessly 
disregarding that anyone who might come upon him unexpectedly while he 
was in the home would likely experience fear for the person’s safety. This 
evidence thus constitutes “some evidence … from which a reasonable jury 
could find,” Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, that when Defendant entered the 
Taylors’ home, he was “reckless as to whether his presence w[ould] cause 
fear for the safety of another.” 
-11- 
 Point II. During Defendant’s case in chief, Celeste McCulley 
acknowledged on cross-examination that Zakary Taylor called her a few days 
after the funeral to ask why Defendant was at the Taylors’ house on the day 
of the funeral. The prosecutor asked, “Isn’t it true that you told Zakary Taylor 
that” Defendant “went to the house to get a momento or a token?” McCulley 
said, “No, I did not say that.” In rebuttal, Zakary testified that when he called 
McCulley after the funeral, McCulley had told him that Defendant “was just 
in” the Taylors’ home “looking for a momento or some—something 
sentimental.” When Defendant objected to Zakary’s testimony as hearsay, the 
court overruled the objection, ruling that “it’s not offered for the truth,” but 
rather “to impeach what [McCulley] denied.”   
 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted 
McCulley’s prior inconsistent statement through Zakary Taylor.  Defendant 
asserts the error prejudiced him because the State used the statement as 
substantive evidence—for the truth of the matter asserted—during closing 
argument. Defendant’s argument lacks merit. 
 First, a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is admissible as 
substantive evidence under rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. Thus, 
Defendant got a windfall when the trial court ruled that it was admissible 
only for impeachment purposes. Second, the State did not reference 
-12- 
McCulley’s statement during closing argument, let alone use it as substantive 
evidence of Defendant’s guilt.  
 Point III. Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it 
did not define “intent” for purposes of burglary’s “intent to commit … theft” 
element. Alternatively, he argues that defense counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. By twice informing the trial 
court that he had no additional instructions to give the jury, Defendant 
invited any error by the trial court. Thus, his plain error claim is precluded 
by the invited error doctrine. Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because 
objectively reasonable defense counsel could conclude that the plain meaning 
of “intent” sufficed to inform the jury of the term’s definition.  
 Point IV. Defendant argues that his conviction must be reversed for 
cumulative error. Defendant, however, has not shown any trial court error or 
any ineffective assistance by his counsel. Because Defendant has not 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S 
DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT GUILTY VERDICTS 
 Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his directed 
verdict motion on the burglary charge, asserting that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the “intent to commit theft” element of that offense. 
Aplt.Br. 26-33. Defendant also argues that the court erroneously denied his 
directed verdict motion on the trespass charge, asserting that the evidence 
was insufficient to support that when he entered the Taylors’ home, he was 
“reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear for the safety of 
another.” Id. Defendant’s arguments fail because the intent as to each charge 
could be inferred from the evidence.  
 When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict motion, this 
Court’s standard of review is “highly deferential.” State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 
10, ¶30, 326 P.3d 645. This Court upholds “the trial court's decision if, upon 
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from 
it,” the Court concludes “that some evidence exists from which a reasonable 
jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, 84 P.3d 1183. This is 
because a trial court “is justified in granting a directed verdict only if, after 
-14- 
examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-
moving party’s favor.” Merino v. Albertson’s, Inc., 1999 UT 14, ¶3, 975 P.2d 467 
(emphasis added). Thus, if “there is any evidence, however slight or 
circumstantial, which tends to show guilt of the crime charged or any of its 
degrees, it is the trial court's duty to submit the case to the jury.” Montoya, 
2004 UT 5, ¶33 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
A. The burglary charge—jurors could reasonably infer from the 
evidence that Defendant unlawfully entered his deceased 
lover’s home when no one was home to take something of 
sentimental value. 
 Defendant was charged with burglary of a dwelling, a second degree 
felony. R13-14. The State was thus required to prove that Defendant 
unlawfully entered another’s dwelling “with intent to commit … theft.” Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1)(a), (2) (West Supp. 2014); see also R96 (Instr. 3A) 
(instructions attached at Addendum B).4 On appeal, Defendant challenges 
only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an entry into the Taylors’ 
home “with intent to commit … theft.” Aplt.Br. 28-30.  
                                              
4 “A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.” 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
-15- 
 The “intent to commit theft is a state of mind, which is rarely 
susceptible of direct proof.” State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1981). 
Thus, it “is well established that [such] intent can be proven by circumstantial 
evidence.” State v. Whitaker, 2016 UT App 104, ¶13, 374 P.3d 56 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
 “When the mental state is proven by circumstantial evidence,” a court 
examines “whether the State presented any evidence that the defendant had 
the requisite intent or knowledge and whether ‘the inferences that can be 
drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human 
experience sufficient to prove that [the defendant] possessed the requisite 
intent.’” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶179, 299 P.3d 892 (quoting State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶21, 10 P.3d 346).  
 Thus, intent “can be inferred from conduct and attendant 
circumstances in the light of human behavior and experience.” Brooks, 631 
P.2d at 881. And when the intent is an intent to commit theft, such 
circumstances include “the manner of entry, the time of day, the character 
and contents of the building, the person’s actions after entry, the totality of 
the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder’s explanation.” State v. 
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 
419, ¶16, 122 P.3d 895 (jury could reasonably infer intent to commit theft from 
-16- 
defendant's unauthorized presence in victim's residence, evidence of forced 
entry, and defendant's subsequent flight). 
 Here, the State presented ample evidence supporting Defendant’s 
intent to commit a theft inside Zakary Taylor’s home: (1) Defendant was April 
Taylor’s lover, R612; (2) their relationship was kept secret from April’s 
husband, Zakary, until just before April died, R436-38; (3) Defendant had 
spent time at April’s house before April’s death, R431,612; (4) Defendant was 
“very upset” about April’s death, R603,613; (5) Defendant went to April’s 
funeral, where he presumably saw Zakary occupied, R319,363; (6) after the 
funeral, Defendant went to the Taylors’ home, went into the back yard, 
carefully removed a screen from a garage window, and crawled into the 
Taylors’ home through the window, R324,365-66,387; (7) about five minutes 
later, Defendant crawled back out the window and carefully replaced the 
screen, R334,366,377; (8) after responding to a neighbor waving at him, 
Defendant walked from the Taylors’ home, quickly got into a waiting silver 
SUV, and left, R329-30,409; (9) when Officer Fielding called Defendant a short 
while later to ask what he was doing at the Taylors’ home, Defendant said he 
was busy and hung up, R466-67; (10) Defendant did not return Officer 
Fielding’s phone call when the officer later left a message asking him to do 
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so, R624; and (11) Defendant did not have permission to enter the Taylors’ 
home on the day of April’s funeral. R445-46.  
 As the State argued in opposing Defendant’s directed verdict motion, 
R491-92, this evidence—especially the brevity of Defendant’s stay in the 
Taylors’ home at a time he could reasonably believe Zakary would not be 
there and Defendant’s unwillingness to talk with Officer Fielding 
afterward—supports a reasonable inference that Defendant unlawfully 
entered the Taylors’ home with the intent to take something from the home—
perhaps something to remember April by. Cf. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 
¶16 (in burglary case, jury could reasonably infer intent to commit theft from 
defendant's unauthorized presence in victim's residence, evidence of forced 
entry, and defendant's subsequent flight).  
 This evidence thus constitutes “some evidence … from which a 
reasonable jury could find that the elements” of burglary—particularly 
Defendant’s intent to commit theft—“had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29. Consequently, it was “the trial court’s duty 
to submit the case to the jury,” id. at ¶33, and the court did not err in denying 
Defendant’s directed verdict motion on the burglary charge. 
 In asserting otherwise, Defendant focuses on the fact that there was no 
evidence that Defendant actually took anything from the Taylors’ home. See 
-18- 
Aplt.Br. 29 (“None of the State’s witnesses … provided any testimony that 
Defendant had been seen carrying anything from the house.”); id. at 29-30 
(“Zakary Taylor … did not notice anything missing.”). But the fact that no 
one noticed anything taken from the Taylors’ home does not mean that 
nothing was taken. More to the point, the crime of burglary “is complete 
when the entry is made with the intent” to commit a theft. State v. Facer, 552 
P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976). “Whether anything is stolen or not has nothing to 
do with the crime.” Id. 
 Defendant also focuses on the State’s response to his directed verdict 
motion—that the State “intended to argue in closing arguments that 
Defendant is ‘where he’s not supposed to be. He’s having an affair with the 
victim’s wife and he’s entering into their home.… A reasonable, plausible 
explanation is he’s there because he’s looking for something.’” Aplt.Br. 28. 
(citing R491-92). According to Defendant, the “prosecutor’s assertion that he 
intended to argue the issue of intent at closing constitutes an admission that 
the State’s case-in-chief lacked evidence of the intent-to-commit-theft 
element.” Id. at 30. 
 That the State intended to argue a reasonable inference arising from the 
evidence it presented, however, is not a concession that the evidence is 
insufficient. Rather, it is simply an acknowledgment that the State must prove 
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the intent element. Because “intent to commit theft is a state of mind, which 
is rarely susceptible of direct proof,” Brooks, 631 P.2d at 881, the State properly 
argued that the evidence was sufficient to prove that element—i.e., the 
circumstantial evidence presented in the State’s case-in-chief supports a 
reasonable inference that Defendant entered the Taylors’ home with the 
intent to commit theft. 
 In sum, Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred when it 
denied his directed verdict motion on the burglary charge.   
B. The trespass charge—jurors could reasonably infer from the 
evidence that Defendant unlawfully entered his deceased 
lover’s home in reckless disregard that his presence would 
cause fear for the safety of another. 
 Defendant also challenges the trial court’s denial of his directed verdict 
motion on the lesser trespass charge. See Aplt.Brf. at 26-33. But Defendant 
was not convicted on the lesser trespass charge. R130. He was convicted of 
the greater burglary offense and, as discussed, the evidence supported that 
conviction. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s directed 
verdict motion on the lesser trespass offense resulted in no prejudice, even 
assuming the trial court erred in denying the motion on the lesser charge. Cf. 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 424 (1973) (“under ordinary factual 
situations where a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater offense, the 
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giving of an erroneous instruction on a lesser offense is not deemed 
prejudicial). 
 But even if the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s directed verdict 
motion on the burglary offense, it correctly concluded that the evidence of 
trespassing was sufficient to send the matter to the jury. To obtain a criminal 
trespass conviction in the case, the State was required to prove that Defendant 
unlawfully entered the Taylors’ home and in doing so, was “reckless as to 
whether his presence [would] cause fear for the safety of another.” Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii) (West Supp. 2012); R97 (Instr. 3B).  
 On appeal, Defendant claims that the State’s evidence was insufficient 
to show that he was “reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear for 
the safety of another” element of trespass. Aplt.Br. 26-33. But as stated, it “is 
well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence.” 
Whitaker, 2016 UT App 104, ¶13 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Even if the evidence did not support a finding of the burglary intent 
element, it certainly supported a finding of the trespass intent element. 
 Here, Defendant entered the Taylors’ home without permission when 
no one was home. R324,365-66,387,445-46. From this evidence, a reasonable 
jury could find, as a matter of common experience, that Defendant entered 
the home recklessly disregarding that anyone who might come upon him 
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unexpectedly while he was in the home would likely experience fear for the 
person’s safety. This evidence thus constitutes “some evidence … from which 
a reasonable jury could find,” Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶29, that when Defendant 
entered the Taylors’ home, he was “reckless as to whether his presence 
w[ould] cause fear for the safety of another,” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
206(a)(iii). 
 Defendant, therefore, also has not shown that the trial court erred when 
it denied Defendant’s directed verdict motion on the trespass charge.  
II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED A WITNESS’S 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT TO IMPEACH THE 
WITNESS, WHERE THE STATEMENT WAS NOT 
ADMITTED FOR THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER 
ASSERTED AND WAS NOT USED AS EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT’S INTENT 
 Defense witness Celeste McCulley testified that she sat near Defendant 
during April Taylor’s funeral and that Defendant spent the rest of the night 
with her and other friends. R601-04. On cross-examination, the prosecutor 
asked whether Zakary Taylor called her a few days after the funeral to ask 
why Defendant was at the Taylors’ house on the day of the funeral. R605-07. 
After the trial court overruled Defendant’s hearsay objection, McCulley 
testified that she had suggested to Zakary that someone else might have 
broken in. R606-07. The prosecutor asked, “Isn’t it true that you told Zakary 
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Taylor that” Defendant “went to the house to get a momento or a token?” 
R607. McCulley said, “No, I did not say that.” Id.5  
 In rebuttal, Zakary testified that when he called McCulley after the 
funeral, McCulley had told him that Defendant “was just in” the Taylors’ 
home “looking for a momento or some—something sentimental.” R621. 
When Defendant objected to Zakary’s testimony as hearsay, the court 
overruled the objection, ruling that “it’s not offered for the truth,” but rather 
“to impeach what [McCulley] denied.” Id. Defendant did not ask that the jury 
be given a limiting instruction.  
 On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted 
McCulley’s memento statement to Zakary because it was inadmissible 
hearsay. Aplt.Br. 33-37. Defendant further argues that its admission 
prejudiced him because it “was central to the State’s case” as “proof of 
Defendant’s intent to commit theft” and, according to Defendant, the State 
“emphasized the statement at closing.” Id. at 37.  
 Defendant’s claim fails. McCulley’s memento statement was not 
hearsay because it was a prior inconsistent statement—admissible as 
                                              
5Two witnesses at Defendant’s trial were named Celeste—Celeste 
Atkinson, who testified for the State, and Celeste McCulley, who testified for 
Defendant. To avoid confusion, the State refers to Celeste McCulley by her 
last name in this argument. 
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substantive evidence under evidence rule 801(d)(1). In any event, the trial 
court admitted the statement as impeachment evidence, not to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted—which also renders the statement nonhearsay. 
And the prosecutor did not use the statement as substantive evidence. Even 
if he had, that use would be harmless because prior inconsistent statements 
can be used substantively. 
 Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, hearsay is a statement that “(1) the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and 
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement.” Utah R. Evid. 801(c). A declarant-witness’s statement is not 
hearsay, however, if the “declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination about a prior statement, and the statement … is inconsistent 
with the declarant’s testimony or the declarant denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten.” Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).6  
 Under these rules, Zakary’s testimony concerning what McCulley told 
him was not hearsay because it was a prior inconsistent statement made by 
McCulley. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). In her testimony during 
                                              
6 Extrinsic evidence “of a witness's prior inconsistent statement is 
admissible … if the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the 
statement and an adverse party is given an opportunity to examine the 
witness about it, or if justice so requires.” Utah R. Evid. 613(b). 
-24- 
Defendant’s case in chief, McCulley denied telling Zakary that Defendant 
went to Zakary’s house to get a memento. R607. In the State’s rebuttal case, 
Zakary testified that McCulley did tell him that Defendant went to the house 
to get a memento. R621. Zakary’s testimony about what McCulley had told 
him was not hearsay under rule 801(d)(1), because McCulley had denied 
making the statement when she testified during Defendant’s case in chief. 
Thus, McCulley’s statement to Zakary was admissible under rule 801(d)(1)—
even for the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R. Evid. 801 Advisory 
committee note (Rule 801(d)(1) “deviates from the federal rule in that it 
allows use of prior statements as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or 
(2) the witness has forgotten”).7 
 In any event, the trial court admitted McCulley’s statement to Zakary 
solely to impeach McCulley with a prior inconsistent statement—not to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. R621-22.  And in that case, it was also not 
hearsay. 
                                              
7 Arguably, McCulley’s statement relayed Defendant’s statement to her 
explaining why he had unlawfully entered the Taylors’ home on the day of 
April’s funeral—to take a memento. But if so, Defendant’s statement to 
McCulley as to why he entered Zakary’s house is still not hearsay, because it 
is an admission of a party-opponent. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (providing 
that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay where it is “offered against an 
opposing party” and “was made by the party in an individual … capacity”). 
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 “[O]ut-of-court statements not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted are by definition not hearsay.” State v. McCullar, 2014 UT App 215, 
¶27, 335 P.3d 900. As this Court has explained, “in many cases a witness who 
‘relates what he heard someone else say’ does not ‘purport[] to represent that 
the statement he heard is true.’” Id. (quoting State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
P.2d 388, 390 (1957)). “Rather, the witness offers the testimony ‘simply to 
prove that someone else made a statement without regard to whether it be 
true or false.’” Id. (quoting Sibert, 310 P.2d at 390).  
 Here, as stated, Zakary’s testimony concerning McCulley’s statement 
was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. R621. Rather, it was 
admitted solely to impeach McCulley by showing that her trial testimony 
concerning what she said to Zakary after the funeral was inconsistent with 
what Zakary recalled her saying. Id. Consequently, the testimony was not 
hearsay, and the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant’s hearsay 
objection to it.  
 In arguing otherwise, Defendant acknowledges that statements not 
admitted for their truth are not hearsay. Aplt.Br. 35. He argues, however, that 
such statements are not hearsay because they “often reveal reasons for one’s 
actions”—explain why the witness who received the statement took a certain 
action. Id. (citing Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, ¶16, 29 P.3d 13; In re G.Y., 
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962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1996)). 
And here, Defendant argues, Zakary Taylor did not take any action based on 
McCulley’s statements. Id. 
 To the extent Defendant argues that such statements are admissible 
only to explain the receiver’s subsequent actions, Defendant is mistaken. 
Perhaps because Utah’s rules of evidence allow the admission of a witness’s 
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence—for the truth of the 
matter asserted—see Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), as well as for impeachment 
purposes, there is scant Utah caselaw distinguishing between prior 
inconsistent statements admitted for their truth and those admitted solely for 
impeachment purposes.  
 But other courts—in jurisdictions that do not allow the admission of 
out-of-court inconsistent statements as substantive evidence—have 
consistently held that such statements are admissible for impeachment 
purposes. See, e.g., Viramontes v. City of Chicao, 840 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“Impeachment evidence is used to impugn a witness's reliability, not to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.”); United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 
1219, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (“‘[A] prior statement offered for impeachment 
purposes is admissible … to show that the speaker is not worthy of belief; it 
is not received for the truth of the matter asserted.’”) (citation omitted); United 
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States v. Vasquez, 225 Fed.Appx. 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (The “Federal Rules 
of Evidence do not classify prior inconsistent statements offered for 
impeachment purposes as hearsay, because they are not offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”); United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 
948, 956 (1st Cir. 1992) (“Impeachment evidence … is admitted not for the 
truth of the matter asserted but solely for the fact that the witness' trial 
testimony is less believable if he has made inconsistent statements about the 
matter on earlier occasions. “); United States v. Graham, 858 F.2d 986, 990 n. 5 
(5th Cir.1988) (“[T]he hallmark of an inconsistent statement offered to 
impeach a witness's testimony is that the statement ... is not offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted; rather, it is offered only to establish that the 
witness has said both ‘x’ and ‘not x’ and is therefore unreliable.”). The trial 
court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that McCulley’s prior inconsistent 
statement was admissible for impeachment purposes.  
 Defendant also argues that McCulley’s statement was improperly 
admitted because despite the trial court’s ruling, the trial court allowed the 
State to use the statement in closing argument as substantive evidence of 
Defendant’s intent when he entered the Taylors’ home. Aplt.Br. 35-37. If this 
were true, the State was in fact entitled to do so under rule 801. See supra, at 
23-24. Accordingly, there would be no prejudice suffered by Defendant in 
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any event. But the prosecutor did not use the statement to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.  
 The State did not even reference McCulley’s memento statement 
during its closing argument, let alone use it as substantive evidence of 
Defendant’s intent to commit theft. R642-56,669-80 (attached at Addendum 
C). The prosecutor argued that “if you can go into the jury room and you can 
find a reasonable explanation as to why he wasn’t there to take something, 
that’s fine.” R645. But the “State can’t think of any reason,” and “it’s 
abundantly clear from the inferences that he was there to go find something 
and take it.” Id. Then, after explaining what circumstantial evidence is, the 
prosecutor argued that the jury could “infer from the fact that [Defendant] 
went into that house,” and that the jury could “infer from the motives that 
are likely that, in fact, he was in there to find something.” R648,650. The 
prosecutor explained, “that’s what we call circumstantial evidence.” 
R648,650.  
 Similarly, in rebuttal, the prosecutor referred the jury to Instruction 
27—the one addressing proof of intent—and reminded the jury that intent, 
“being a state of mind is seldom susceptible to proof of direct or positive 
evidence.” R671. Again, the prosecutor did not mention McCulley’s 
challenged statement. Rather, the prosecutor asked—where Defendant 
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entered his deceased lover’s home, stayed only a few minutes, and then hung 
up on the police when they asked him what he was doing there—“what other 
purpose” was he there for? R671-72.  
 The record, then, does not support Defendant’s contention that the trial 
court improperly admitted McCulley’s challenged statement as hearsay. Nor 
does it support Defendant’s contention that the State used her statement as 
substantive evidence in closing argument. Defendant’s argument that 
McCulley’s statement was improperly admitted hearsay, therefore, fails. 
III  
DEFENDANT’S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
PLAINLY ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON 
THE MENTAL STATE FOR BURGLARY FAILS UNDER THE 
INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE; HIS INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE 
CAN SHOW NEITHER DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE NOR 
PREJUDICE 
 In Point III of his brief, Defendant argues that the trial court committed 
plain error by not instructing the jury on the mental state required for 
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burglary. Aplt.Br. 38-42. In Point IV, Defendant argues that defense counsel 
was ineffective for not requesting such an instruction. Id. at 42-45. 8   
 Defendant nowhere identifies the specific instructional error he claims 
occurred at trial. Id. at 38-45. However, when setting out the statutory 
definition of burglary in his plain error argument, he italicizes the “intent to 
commit” element. Id. at 39. And when arguing prejudice related to his 
ineffective-assistance claim, Defendant asserts that in “light of the issues 
surrounding Defendant’s lack of intent to commit theft, among others, trial 
counsel should have objected to the lack of instruction.” Id. at 44. It thus 
appears that Defendant’s complaint on appeal is that the burglary elements 
instruction was not supplemented with an instruction defining “intent” in 
the “intent to commit theft” element.   
 The invited error doctrine precludes Defendant’s plain error claim. 
Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim fails because he has not shown that no 
                                              
8 Although Defendant also challenges the absence of a specific intent 
instruction related to the “reckless” element of trespass, Aplt.Br. 38-45, 
Defendant was not convicted on that charge. R130. Thus, any error in the 
instructions related to it was necessarily harmless. See State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 
2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1973) (“under ordinary factual situations where 
a jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater offense, the giving of an 
erroneous instruction on a lesser offense is not deemed prejudicial). The State, 
therefore, responds only to Defendant’s arguments related to the burglary 
charge on which he was convicted.  
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competent counsel would proceed without requesting an instruction and 
because he was not prejudiced by the lack of an instruction. 
A. Defendant’s plain error claim fails under the invited error 
doctrine.  
 “While a party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have 
an instruction assigned as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah 
R. Crim. P. 19(e), ‘a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial 
when the party led the trial court into committing the error.’” State v. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶9, 86 P.3d 742 (citations omitted). Consequently, 
under the invited error doctrine, “a jury instruction may not be assigned as 
error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice ‘if counsel, either 
by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction.’” Id.  (citation omitted).   
 In this case, the elements instructions were included in the trial court’s 
opening instructions. R93-112. Before the court read those instructions to the 
jury, the court asked if defense counsel had “any objections” to them. R291. 
Counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Id.  
 The closing instructions—which included various instructions on 
mental state—were addressed repeatedly during trial. At one point, the court 
went through each instruction individually and confirmed with both counsel 
that they had no objection to each individual instruction. R346-57. At the close 
-32- 
of that discussion, the court asked, “Were there any other instructions that the 
prosecution or the defense wanted to insert but have not?“ R357. (emphasis added) 
Defense counsel responded, “No.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 Finally, before reading the closing instructions to the jury, the court 
asked whether the prosecution had “any additions” and whether there was 
“anything else.” R631-32. The prosecutor responded, “I believe we’re okay 
with them, Your Honor.” R632. When the court asked defense counsel, he 
said, “I didn’t see anything either, Your Honor.” Id.  
 Repeatedly throughout trial, then, defense counsel “affirmatively 
represented to the court” both that counsel had no objection to the 
instructions given and that no additional instructions were required. 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶9. Defendant therefore invited any instructional 
error by the trial court, and his plain error claim is precluded by the invited 
error doctrine.  Id.   
B. Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails because he has 
not shown either that all other competent counsel would have 
requested the specific intent instruction or that he was 
prejudiced by the instruction’s absence.   
 To show that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove both 
that his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694, 697 (1984). “Surmounting 
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Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
371 (2010). Defendant has not overcome that high bar. 
1. Defendant cannot show deficient performance—that no 
competent counsel would have forgone the specific intent 
instructions. 
 To prove deficient performance, Defendant must show “that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 687-88. To meet that burden, Defendant must rebut the “strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.” id. at 689. To do that, Defendant must “persuad[e] 
the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions.” State 
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted).  
 But a defendant’s ability to rebut Strickland’s presumption “does not … 
automatically mean that an attorney's performance was constitutionally 
inadequate.” Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1051 (10th Cir. 2002). The 
presumption is “simply [a] tool[] that assist[s] … in analyzing Strickland’s 
deficient performance prong.” Id. at 1046. And although the presumption can 
be dispositive, it is dispositive only of a finding of effective performance, not 
deficient performance.  
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 Consequently, whether counsel’s performance has a conceivable 
strategic basis is only the first step of in evaluating Strickland’s deficient 
performance prong.  The inquiry must go further.  If counsel’s performance 
lacks any conceivable strategic basis, a reviewing court must still ask whether 
counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable.  See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 
528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1048. 
 This is because the “relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices 
were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 
481. Moreover, to decide whether counsel’s choices were reasonable, the 
crucial “question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 
incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated 
from best practices or most common custom.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 
86, 105 (2011). There is “no expectation that competent counsel will be a 
flawless strategist or tactician.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. “The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy 
judged with the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) 
(per curiam); accord Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 18 (2013); Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687.  
 Counsel, therefore, does not necessarily perform deficiently even if he 
makes “minor mistakes” during trial. Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 487 (9th 
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Cir. 2000). Indeed, “even if an omission is inadvertent, relief is not 
automatic.” Gentry, 540 U.S. at 8. “To state the obvious, the trial lawyers, in 
every case, could have done something more or something different. So, 
omissions are inevitable. But, the issue is not what is possible or ‘what is 
prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’” 
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000)) (quoting Burger 
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). 
 The “relevant question under Strickland” is whether “no competent 
attorney” would have done the same. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011); 
see also Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(counsel deficient only when “counsel’s error is so egregious that no 
reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly”); Chandler v. 
United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 & n.17 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (to show 
deficient performance, defendant “must establish that no competent counsel 
would have taken the action that his counsel did take”). And even when an 
attorney errs, “[i]t will generally be appropriate for a reviewing court to 
assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case in order to 
determine whether the ‘identified acts or omissions' overcome the 
presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance.” 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). Thus, “‘where counsel's 
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representation is objectively reasonable under all the circumstances of a case 
and ensured that the defendant received a fair trial overall, it makes no 
difference that certain decisions may have been unreasonable or made 
without a full recognition of the consequences.’” Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1049 
(quoting United States v. Smith, 20 F.3d 724, 729 (10th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). 
 Here, Defendant has not met his heavy burden of showing that 
counsel’s performance was unreasonable. As stated, Defendant’s contention 
appears to be that defense counsel should have sought a jury instruction 
defining “intent” for purposes of burglary’s “intent to commit … theft” 
element. Aplt.Br. 38-45. 
 Defendant, however, nowhere identifies what that instruction should 
have been. Id. Presumably, his contention is that counsel should have sought 
an instruction on the statutory definition of the intentional mental statute. 
Thus, presumably, Defendant’s contention is that counsel should have 
sought an instruction that a person acts “[i]ntentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (West 2015). 
 But this definition matches the plain meaning of “intent”: “the design 
or purpose to commit a wrongful or criminal act” or “a usually clearly 
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formulated or planned intention,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/intent (visited September 19, 2017); “intention or purpose,” 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/intent (visited September 19, 
2017); “something that is intended; purpose; design,” http://www. 
dictionary.com/browse/intent (visited September 19, 2017); “purpose, 
object, aim,” https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/ 
intent (visited September 19, 2017). See also http://www. dictionary.com/ 
browse/intentionally (defining “intentionally” as “done with intention or on 
purpose”) (visited September 19, 2017); https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/intentionally (defining intentionally as “deliberately; on 
purpose”) (last visited September 19, 2017).  
 And both the statutory definition and the plain meaning of “intent” are 
consistent with what the State suggested in its opening statement—that 
Defendant “went in [the Taylors’ home] looking for something, to take 
something,” “for the purposes of retrieving something from that house.” 
R208-09.  
 Thus, competent counsel could have reasonably concluded that a jury 
instruction was not necessary because the meaning of “intent” was “within 
the jury’s common knowledge.” People v. Powell, 512 N.E.2d 1364 (Ill. Ct. App. 
1987) (rejecting contention that trial court erred in not defining “intentionally 
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and knowingly” for jury, concluding that “those terms have a plain meaning 
within the jury's common knowledge”).   
 Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, then, fails on the deficient 
performance element alone. But it also fails on the prejudice element. 
 2. Defendant cannot show prejudice. 
 
 To prove prejudice, Defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable 
probability” that but for counsel’s performance, “the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Id. In other words, “[t]he likelihood of a different result must be 
substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693) (emphasis added). 
 For the same reason Defendant cannot show deficient performance, he 
cannot show prejudice. The definitional instruction he claims defense counsel 
should have sought would, in essence, have provided the jury with nothing 
more than the plain meaning of “intent.” See pp. 36-37 supra. There is no 
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reasonable likelihood that the result of Defendant’s trial would have been 
different, therefore, had the instruction been given.9 
IV 
DEFENDANT’S CUMULATIVE ERROR ARGUMENT FAILS 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN ANY ERROR, 
LET ALONE PREJUDICE THEREFROM.  
 Finally, Defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine entitles 
him to relief.  Aplt.Br. 45-46. This Court “will reverse a jury verdict under the 
cumulative error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines … confidence that a fair trial was had.”  State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 
49, ¶58, 191 P.3d 17 (quotation omitted); State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶107, 322 
P.3d 624 (cumulative error applies when a court’s “collective errors rise to a 
level that undermine[s] our confidence in the fairness of the proceedings”).  
Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying his 
directed verdict motion or admitting McCulley’s “memento” statement. Nor 
                                              
9 The State notes that at one point in his argument, Defendant observes 
that the jury was provided a definition instruction for “knowingly.” Aplt.Br. 
40; see also R122 (Instr. 28). Defendant does not claim, however, either plain 
error or ineffective assistance related to that instruction. See id. In any event, 
that instruction, combined with the absence of an instruction defining 
“intent,” would only impress upon the jury that it should apply the plain 
meaning of “intent” in the burglary statute. Alternatively, the “knowingly” 
instruction was superfluous and, thus, harmless. See State v. Malaga, 2006 UT 
App 103, ¶14, 132 P.3d 703 (because instruction was superfluous, any error 
in giving it was harmless); State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah App. 1987) 
(same). 
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has Defendant demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient in 
any respect. Because Defendant has not demonstrated any error, the 
cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable. See Perea, 2013 UT 68, ¶107. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant’s 
burglary conviction. 
 Respectfully submitted on September 21, 2017. 
 SEAN D. REYES 
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